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INTRODUCTION
We turn at times to physiology or embryology or chemistry or medicine-to
a Jenner, or a Pasteur, or a Virchow, or a Lister, as freely or submissively as
to a Blackstone or a Coke.
Benjamin N. CardozolO n March 25, 1993, Assemblyman John C. Cochrane introduced
a proposed code of evidence to the Committee on Codes of the
New York State General Assembly.2 Included in the proposed code
is Rule 702(b) entitled "Scientific Testimony."'3 Offered to govern
the admissibility of expert opinion at trial, Rule 702(b) would write
the oft-criticized "general acceptance" test into the consolidated
laws.4 Although the drafters of the proposed rules intended to cod-
ify present state law,5 a careful examination of case law shows that
the national trend away from "general acceptance" has begun in
New York.'
Reflecting the nation's increasing discomfort with the "general
acceptance" standard, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.7 at the end of the 1992 term. In the opinion, the Court estab-
lished a new test to be used in judging the admissibility of scien-
tific expert testimony at federal trials. s Daubert laid to rest a bat-
1. Beuschel v. Manowitz, 271 N.Y.S. 277, 279 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (quoting New York Court
of Appeals Chief Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo in a speech before the New York Academy of
Medicine).
2. N.Y. A.B. 6335, 215th Gen. Ass'y, 1st Sess. (1993). The bill was introduced to "enact
a new chapter in the consolidated laws to be named the code of evidence." Id. For a discus-
sion of the history of the various versions of the code, see infra notes 40-41 and accompany-
ing text.
3. N.Y. A.B. 6335, 215th Gen. Ass'y, 1st Sess. §702(b) (1993).
4. The "general acceptance" test, developed in the seminal case Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), requires that scientific expert testimony be inadmissible unless
its basis has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at
1014. For a full discussion of the Frye "general acceptance" test, see infra part I.
5. Letter from Robert M. Pitler, Law Revision Commission, to Governor Mario M.
Cuomo (March 21, 1991), in THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMW'N, A CODE OF Evi-
DENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK xviii, xxi (1991).
6. See infra part III.D. In numerous jurisdictions, courts have rejected the "general
acceptance" test. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1019 (1975); Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. 1991); Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d
69 (Del. 1993); State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981);
State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993);
Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tx. Crim. App. 1992); Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo.
1992).
7. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
8. Id. at 2786. For a complete discussion of this new test, see infra part III.C.
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tle that had raged for decades concerning whether the Federal
Rules of Evidence required courts to use the "general acceptance"
standard to the exclusion of other methodologies." By rejecting the
exclusive use of "general acceptance," the Daubert Court heralded
a transformation in the manner by which judges will determine the
admissibility of scientific testimony.10
Given this movement in expert testimony law, the legislature
would be well advised to re-examine proposed Rule 702(b) as it is
currently drafted. This Comment will demonstrate that New York
State would be ill-served by writing "general acceptance" into the
consolidated laws. Part I examines the "general acceptance" test
and its manifestation in New York case law. In part II, the Com-
ment surveys the current state codification effort and specifies the
manner in which proposed New York Rule 702(b) embodies the
"general acceptance" standard. Part III supports the contention
that Rule 702(b) should be re-examined by discussing the scholarly
criticisms of "general acceptance," by analyzing the profound legal
changes forecast by the Supreme Court in Daubert, by demon-
strating that strands of New York's case law are inconsistent with
Rule 702(b), and by suggesting that the twin goals of uniformity
and reform can be realized only through substantive changes in the
proposed rule. In part IV, the Comment concludes by offering
model legislation.
9. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203A (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Paul
C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) [hereinafter, Giannelli, Novel Scientific Evi-
dence]; Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
REv. 643 (1992); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogis-
tic Structure of Scientific Testimony, N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988); David McCord, Syndromes,
Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontradi-
tional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19 (1987); Mark McCor-
mick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REv. 879
(1982) [hereinafter, McCormick, Scientific Evidence]; Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1984);
John W. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL.
L.F. 1; William A. Thomas, Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79
(1987).
For a discussion of the logical underpinnings cited by both supporters and detractors of
the Frye test, see infra part III.A.
10. Although only federal courts are bound by United States Supreme Court prece-
dents, many states have codes modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence and closely
follow the Supreme Court's interpretations of the language's meaning. See Nelson v. State,
628 A.2d 69, 73-74 (Del. 1993)- (following Daubert by rejecting Frye in favor of a "reliabil-




I. THE "GENERAL ACCEPTANCE" STANDARD
A. The Seminal Case: Frye v. United States
The most authoritative statement of the "general acceptance"
standard was made in the 1923 case Frye v. United States." Faced
with judging the evidentiary strength of a novel scientific tech-
nique, the trial court refused to admit expert testimony based on
the test results of an early polygraph. 2 The defense's polygraph
evidence purported to show that the defendant had truthfully de-
nied involvement in the murder for which he was charged. 13 On
review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district judge's determi-
nation that the novel scientific evidence was inadmissible.14 The
court's short and citation free opinion included language that con-
stituted the Frye admissibility test:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."'
In essence, evidentiary reliability was conditioned upon the ap-
proval of scientists in the field.
Since the Frye decision, the "general acceptance" test has had
11. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For an in-depth discussion of the Frye decision, see 22
CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5168
(1978); Roger S. Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye is Sixty-Five Years Old: Should He Retire?,
16 W. ST. U. L. REV. 357 (1989).
For perspectives of the Frye ruling over time, see Charles T. McCormick, Deception-
Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CAL. L. REV. 484, 499 n.49 (1927); William Wicker, The
Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711, 715 (1953); Com-
ment, The Use of Psychological Tests to Determine the Credibility of Witnesses, 33 YALE
L.J. 771, 773-74 (1924). For a discussion of the state of scientific evidence before the advent
of Frye, see David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door,
Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of
Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDoZO L. REV. 1799, 1803-05 (1994).
12. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
13. Id. at 1014. There is reliable evidence that another person ultimately admitted to
committing the murder for which James A. Frye was convicted. Wicker, supra note 11, at
715 (citing 14TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 265 (1948)). Others claim
that this account is fanciful. Charles M. Sevilla, Polygraph 1984: Behind the Closed Door of
Admissibility, 16 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 5, 7 n.3 (1984).
14. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
15. Id. (emphasis added).
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a significant impact upon the evidence law of the nation's courts.16
During the last two decades, for example, nine United States
Courts of Appeals have applied Frye's methodology. 17 Among state
jurisdictions, at least thirty-three have mirrored these circuits and
employed the test during the last twenty years.'8 New York is in-
16. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[03],
at 702-39 & n.12 (1991) (citing use of Frye by the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
District of Columbia Circuits); Symposium on Science and Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D.
188, 199-201 (1983) (cataloging the acceptance of Frye by numerous federal circuits and
states); Giannelli, Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 9, at 1205 (stating that "the Frye
test has dominated the admissibility of scientific evidence for more than half a century").
17. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming
the Frye-based admissibility of expert medical testimony), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280
(1992); United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1530-37 (11th Cir. 1989) (vacating a
criminal conviction on grounds that the defense's polygraph evidence met the Frye admissi-
bility test); United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 477 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing the trial
court for failing to use Frye when deciding whether to admit child sexual abuse testimony);
United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (approving Frye when affirming
the admissibility of pathological gambling disorder testimony), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817
(1987); United States v. Carmel, 801 F.2d 997, 998 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming Frye-based
admissibility of pathological-gambling-disorder evidence); United States v. McBride, 786
F.2d 45, 49-51 (2d Cir. 1986) (reversing the trial court's refusal to admit expert psychologi-
cal testimony that met the Frye standard); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 892, 898 (10th
Cir. 1985) (affirming Frye-based admissibility of testimony based upon breathalyzer tests);
United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (approving Frye-based denial of
admissibility for pathological-gambling-disorder evidence); United States v. Distler, 671
F.2d 954, 961-62 (6th Cir. 1981) (approving Frye when affirming the admissibility of testi-
mony based on gas chromatograph analysis), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
As of 1991, Frye was also being used by trial courts in the Third and Fourth Circuits.
105 A.L.R. FED. 299 § 4[a] (1991 & Supp. 1994).
18. Prewitt v. State, 460 So. 2d 296, 302 (Ala. 1984) (applying Frye methodology to
hypnotically refreshed testimony); Shepard v. State, 847 P.2d 75, 81 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993)
(applying Frye methodology to psychiatric testimony); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior
Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1282 (Ariz. 1982) (applying Frye methodology to hypnotically re-
freshed testimony); Dumond v. State, 743 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Ark. 1988) (applying Frye meth-
odology to semen allotyping technology); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976)
(applying Frye methodology to voiceprints); Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 891 (Colo.
1993) (applying Frye methodology to DNA typing evidence); State v. Miller, 522 A.2d 249,
260 (Conn. 1987) (applying Frye methodology to polygraph); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d
827, 828 (Fla. 1993) (applying Frye methodology to sex offender profile evidence); State v.
Garrett, 811 P.2d 488, 881 (Idaho 1991) (applying Frye methodology to horizontal gaze nys-
tagmus tests); People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1074 (Ill. 1981) (applying Frye methodol-
ogy to polygraph); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ind. 1983) (applying Frye meth-
odology to hypnotically refreshed testimony); State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan.
1982) (applying Frye methodology to rape trauma syndrome); Harris v. Commonwealth, 846
S.W.2d 678, 681 (Ky. 1992) (applying Frye methodology to DNA typing); Reed v. State, 391
A.2d 364, 371-72 (Md. 1978) (applying Frye methodology to voiceprints); Commonwealth v.
Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Mass. 1975) (applying Frye methodology to voiceprint analy-
sis); People v. Tobey, 257 N.W.2d 537, 538 (Mich. 1977) (applying Frye methodology to
voiceprints); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980) (applying Frye methodology
to hypnotically refreshed testimony); Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 390 (Miss. 1992) (apply-
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cluded in those states that continue to apply "general
acceptance."' 19
B. Frye's Standard in New York: People v. Wesley
New York courts have had a long and close relationship with
the "general acceptance" test. The Frye case was first cited as sup-
port for an admissibility ruling by a state court in 1934.20 The
Court of Appeals explicitly used Frye as support for an evidentiary
ruling as early as 1938, referring to the test as one of "general sci-
entific recognition."'" Modern cases have continued to point to
Frye as a reliable statement of New York evidence law.22
ing Frye methodology to DNA fingerprinting evidence); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 369
(Mo. 1972) (applying Frye methodology to neutron activation analysis); State v. Palmer, 313
N.W.2d 648, 655 (Neb. 1981) (applying Frye methodology to hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 488-89 (N.H. 1992) (applying Frye methodology
to DNA profile analysis); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 1981) (applying Frye method-
ology to hypnotically refreshed testimony); State v. Beachum, 643 P.2d 246, 252 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1981) (applying Frye methodology to hypnotically refreshed testimony); People v.
Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484, 490 (N.Y. 1983) (applying Frye methodology to hypnotically re-
freshed testimony); Yell v. State, 856 P.2d 996, 996 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (applying Frye
methodology to horizontal gaze nystagmus evidence); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436
A.2d 170, 177 (Pa. 1981) (applying Frye methodology to hypnotically refreshed testimony);
State v. Dery, 545 A.2d 1014, 1016 (R.I. 1988) (applying Frye methodology to polygraph
evidence); State v. Squires, 426 S.E.2d 738, 740 (S.C. 1992) (applying Frye methodology to
infrared spectroscopy); State v. Helmer, 278 N.W.2d 808, 812 (S.D. 1979) (applying Frye
methodology to breathalyzer); Zani v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)
(applying Frye methodology to hypnotically refreshed testimony); Phillips v. Jackson, 615
P.2d 1228, 1233-34 (Utah 1980) (applying Frye methodology to human leucocyte antigen
test); State v. Canaday, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (Wash. 1978) (applying Frye methodology to
breathalyzer); State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659, 675-76 (W. Va. 1980) (applying Frye meth-
odology to hair analysis).
19. E.g., People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994) (applying Frye methodol-
ogy to DNA profiling); People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 134 (N.Y. 1990) (applying Frye
methodology to rape trauma syndrome); People v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484, 490 (N.Y. 1983)
(applying Frye methodology to hypnotically refreshed testimony).
20. Beuschel v. Manowitz, 271 N.Y.S. 277, 280 (Sup. Ct. 1934), rev'd on other grounds,
272 N.Y.S. 165 (App. Div. 1934).
21. People v. Forte, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (N.Y. 1938). The "general recognition" language
was used earlier that year in the trial court decision in People v. Forte, 4 N.Y.S.2d 913, 916
(Cty. Ct. 1938). This "recognition" phraseology has continued to be utilized in such cases as
People v. Williams, 159 N.E.2d 549, 555 (N.Y. 1959), People v. Leone, 255 N.E.2d 696, 699
(N.Y. 1969), and as recently as 1980 in People v. Vinson, 428 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (Sup. Ct.
1980). It appears that this specialized language for the "general acceptance" methodology
has developed in New York and, consistent with the subject matter of each of the aforemen-
tioned cases, is used when a court is considering the admissibility of the polygraph. None-
theless, it is clear that the "general recognition" and "general acceptance" tests are one and
the same. See In re Jazmine M., 528 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772 (Fain. Ct. 1988).
22. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 134 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Smith, 468
N.E.2d 879, 888 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985); People v. Middleton, 429
1995] PROPOSED RULE OF EVIDENCE 702(b) 235
In 1994, the Court of Appeals revisited its adherence to the
"general acceptance" standard in People v. Wesley.23 Wesley
presented an appeal from a criminal conviction based, at least in
part,24 upon DNA-based evidence.25 Prior to trial, the lower court
had held an in liminie hearing 26 to judge "DNA profiling" evi-
dence, the admissibility of which was an issue of first impression in
New York.2 ' Announcing that Frye remained New York's standard
N.E.2d 100, 103 (N.Y. 1981).
It is interesting to note, however, that the earliest citations to Frye in New York's case
law were used to support a rule of law that is, at least facially, different from that found in
the original D.C. Circuit opinion. While the Frye court had found that, to be admissible, a
scientific technique "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs," Frye, 293 F. at 1014, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has stated that "the test is . . .whether a particular procedure . . . is generally ac-
ceptable as reliable." Middleton, 429 N.E.2d at 103 (emphasis added). The words "as relia-
ble," which are noticeably missing from the opinion of the Frye court, appear to come from
earlier New York cases that conditioned admissibility upon "general reliability." E.g., Peo-
ple v. Leone, 255 N.E.2d 696, 700 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that "[the technique] has not as yet
become sufficiently definite to be generally reliable so as to warrant judicial acceptance");
People v. Magri, 147 N.E.2d 728, 730 (N.Y. 1958) (stating that "time by watches and clocks,
identity by fingerprinting, and ballistic evidence, among a variety of kindred scientific meth-
ods, are freely accepted in our courts for their general reliability").
The delineation of New York's standard by the Middleton court in 1981 has continued
to be repeated by the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454
(N.Y. 1994) (holding that "the particular procedure ...must be 'generally acceptable as
reliable' "); People v. Jeter, 600 N.E.2d 214, 215 (N.Y. 1992) (stating that "New York has
not yet held that spectrographic evidence has gained general acceptance in the scientific
community as reliable"); People v. Schreiner, 573 N.E.2d 552, 555 (N.Y. 1991) (concluding
that "hypnosis had not been generally accepted in the scientific community as reliable").
For a discussion of the courts' emphases on "reliability" and their impacts upon the
propriety of enacting proposed Rule 702(b), see infra part Ill.D.
23. 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994).
24. According to the majority, "[e]ven without the DNA profiling evidence, proof of
defendant's guilt is compelling." Id. at 453. The majority noted associations between the
defendant and the victim, bloodstain and fiber evidence from both the defendant's and vic-
tim's clothing, and statements made by the defendant during police interrogation as the
additional "compelling" proof. Id.
25. Id. George Wesley was convicted at trial of murder, rape, attempted sodomy, and
burglary. Id. The victim was found in her Albany apartment in 1987; DNA evidence pur-
ported to show that the genetic material drawn from bloodstains on the defendant's clothing
matched that from decedent's hair follicles, but failed to match the defendant's own DNA.
Id.
26. The "general acceptance" hearing has come to be known as a "Frye hearing," and
was so-called by the trial judge in Wesley. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Sup. Ct.
1988). The Frye hearing was prompted by a prosecution motion seeking a court-ordered
sample of the defendant's blood for DNA analysis. Id. at 643.
27. Id. at 644. Although the Court of Appeals referred to the process as "DNA profil-
ing," Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 457, the trial judge used the phrase "DNA fingerprinting," a
term more commonly used. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 645. In this case, the specific procedure
involved RFLP analysis (Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism). Wesley, 633 N.E.2d
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by which scientific evidence must be judged,28 the trial court con-
cluded that DNA-based tests had "gained general acceptance in
the scientific community" and were, therefore, admissible. 9
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, hold-
ing that "DNA profiling" technology had been "generally accepted
as reliable by the relevant scientific community. '8  By citing to
Frye,31 as well as its New York progeny, 2 the majority reaffirmed
the long-held admissibility requirement. The court thus demon-
strated its clear preference that New York evidence law should re-
main moored to the common law "general acceptance" standard.
II. NEW YORK'S EVIDENCE CODE AND PROPOSED RULE 702(b)
A. Efforts Toward Codification
The New York Court of Appeals' adherence to Frye's method-
ology is but one example of the common law underpinnings of the
evidence law in the state. To the present, much of New York's evi-
dence law has been dictated, not by a codified set of rules, but by
common law notions.3 These judge-made bases for admitting ex-
pert opinion have been criticized for leading to contradictory re-
at 457-59.
28. "The ultimate standard for the admission of scientific evidence in the State of New
York ... is Frye v. United States." Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
29. Id. at 659. The court came to this conclusion after hearing multiple adverse experts
because "it was necessary that [the] hearing [was] both extensive and intensive, so that a
record [could] be produced of a quality and thoroughness sufficient for the Court of Appeals
ultimately to decide [the] matter." Id. at 644-45.
30. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 455.
31. Id. at 454.
32. E.g., People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d
484 (N.Y. 1983).
33. Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That is the Question: A Study of
New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641, 641 (1992); see also
HAROLD BAER, JR., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THEIR NEW YORK PARALLELS (1986);
EUGENE R. CANUDO, EVIDENCE LAWS OF NEW YORK (1969); JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, NEW
YORK LAW OF EVIDENCE (1974). These sources illustrate that some of New York evidence is
controlled by various sections of the consolidated laws, but that evidence in New York is
largely a common law construct.
For example, Judge Baer's work demonstrates that New York evidence law is a
hodgepodge of legislative acts embodied in the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), the
Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), the Uniform Justice Court Act, the Family Court Act, and
the Domestic Relations Law. BAER, supra, at 1-2. In addition, Judge Baer illustrates many
instances in which evidentiary rules are dictated by judicial precedent with no underlying
statutory basis. See id. at 10 (citing, e.g., People v. Lediard, 548 N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div.
1981), as the basis for the common law rule requiring that "cross examination is limited only
to questioning whether the witness has heard derogatory reports or rumors" for which there
is no underlying statutory basis).
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sults,34 being unnecessarily cumbersome, 35 and making the law less
accessible to the legal and lay communities .3  These undesirable
aspects of the State's current legal regimen have prompted calls for
a codified set of evidentiary standards. 7
The 1993 submission of the proposed code of evidence is the
most recent manifestation of an attempt to "consolidate, simplify,
and where appropriate, revise the laws governing the presentation
of evidence" in New York State. 8 Charged with these goals, the
Law Revision Commission 9 has worked for nearly two decades on
an evidence code, the fulfillment of which has vexed the State for
over one-hundred and forty years.40 Its current proposal is pending
34. For a discussion of one such contradictory result, see FAUST Rossi, EXPERT WIT-
NESSES 14-15 (1991). Rossi compares two New York cases that address the admissibility of
specialized testimony. In Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 351 N.E.2d 735 (N.Y. 1976),
expert testimony was deemed inadmissible because the knowledge on which it was based
was within the realm of experience of the average juror. Id. at 740. Conversely, the court in
Selkowitz v. County of Nassau, 379 N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 1978), found that expert testimony,
despite its basis on knowledge within the realm of the average juror, was admitted because
it would prove helpful to the jury's decision-making. Id. at 1143-44.
35. Salken, supra note 33, at 668-72. Some commentators argue that the consolidation
of evidentiary rules would be more efficient and would lead to better quality in lawyers'
arguments and judicial decisions. Id. at 664 (citing Proposed Code of Evidence for the State
of New York: Joint Public Hearing of the New York State Law Revision Commission, Sen-
ate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the Judici-
ary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Committee on Codes
460-61 (Nov. 19, 1980) (testimony of Richard Rifkin); Proposed Code of Evidence for the
State of New York: Joint Public Hearing of the New York State Law Revision Commission,
Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Committee on Codes
227 (Feb. 25, 1983) (testimony of Robert Pitler); Proposed Code of Evidence for the State
of New York: Joint Public Hearing of the New York State Law Revision Commission, Sen-
ate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the Judici-
ary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Committee on Codes
33 (July 25, 1990) (testimony of Judge William Donnino)).
36. Salken, supra note 33, at 664-68. A law of evidence that is anchored in the common
law, scattered through disconnected cases and disjointed statutes, is difficult to find. Id. at
664. Salken notes that over nine thousand of New York's statutory provisions concern evi-
dence. Id. (citing Eugene Canudo & Harold Corn, Proposal for Codification of the New
York Law of Evidence, 1973 N.Y. ST. B. J. 527, 528).
37. Salken, supra note 33, at 703-04.
38. Michael Martin, Proposed Code of Evidence (Part I), N.Y. L.J., Apr. 13, 1990, at 3
(quoting the original instructions given to the Law Revision Commission by the legislature
when the code's preparation was commissioned in 1976).
39. The Commission was created by Chapter 597 of the Laws of 1934, Article 4-A of the
Legislative Law. It consists of five members appointed by the Governor, and the chairmen
of the Judiciary and Codes Committees of the Senate and Assembly as members ex officio.
THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW
YORK at ii (1991).
40. The first attempt at codification was in 1849. See Salken, supra note 33, at 653. To
date, there have been six attempts at codification. Id. at 653-59.
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before the legislature in Albany.4'
B. Proposed Rule 702(b): "Scientific Testimony"
Included in the proposed code of evidence is Rule 702(b) enti-
tled "Scientific Testimony. '42 This rule, offered to govern the ad-
missibility of expert scientific testimony at trial, would write the
"general acceptance" methodology into the consolidated laws.4 3
The proposed rule provides:
Testimony concerning scientific matters, or testimony concerning the result
of a scientific procedure, test or experiment is admissible provided: (1) there
is general acceptance within the relevant scientific community of the valid-
ity of the theory or principle underlying the matter, procedure, test or ex-
periment; (2) there is general acceptance within the relevant scientific com-
munity that the procedure, test, or experiment is reliable and produces
accurate results; and (3) the particular test, procedure or experiment was
conducted in such a way as to yield an accurate result. Upon request of a
party, a determination pursuant to this subdivision shall be made before the
commencement of trial.
44
41. Id. at 659-62. Funded by the legislature in 1976, the Commission had prepared its
first draft by 1979. Id. at 660. The original draft was presented in 1980, revised, and re-
submitted to the legislature in 1982. Martin, supra note 38, at 3. After the proposal lan-
guished in Albany, the Governor restarted the process in 1988 and was presented with the
most recent version in 1991. Id. As of March, 1995, the proposal was pending in committee.
See legislative history of N.Y. A.B. 6335, 215th Gen. Ass'y (1993), available in Westlaw,
NY-Billtrk database.
42. THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COAM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE
OF NEw YORK 162 (1991). Proposed Rule 702(b) is a subsection of a larger Rule 702 entitled
"Testimony by experts, scientific theories, tests and experiments, and psychiatric testimony
in certain criminal cases." Id. at 161-65. Proposed Rule 702 contains three subsections: Sub-
section (a) entitled "Testimony by experts," subsection (b) entitled "Scientific testimony,"
and subsection (c) entitled "Psychiatric testimony in certain criminal cases." Id.
The full text of proposed Rule 702(a) reads:
A witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or.other-
wise may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise concerning scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge that is beyond the understanding or will dis-
pel misconceptions of the typical trier of fact, thereby helping the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
Id. at 161-62. The comments to Rule 702(a) indicate that this rule would control expert
testimony of a non-scientific nature, such as property valuation, corporation management,
and the meaning of slang words, such as those used by gamblers and drug traffickers. Id. at
163.
For a complete discussion of the proposed rule, see Daniel J. Capra, Proposed New
York Code (Part II), N.Y. L.J., May 15, 1990, at 3.
43. The comments to Rule 702(b) indicate that this rule, unlike Rule 702(a), is in-
tended to govern the "admissibility of scientific matters and theories or scientific proce-
dures, tests or experiments and their results." THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COM'N,
A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 164 (1991).
44. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
PROPOSED RULE OF EVIDENCE 702(b)
The language of subsections (1) and (2), as well as the comments
accompanying the proposed rule, display a clear intention on the
part of the drafters to make Frye the operative test for admitting
scientific expert testimony in New York State.45
III. NOT THIS 702(b), NEw YORK
Although codification could serve worthy ends, fixing the Frye
methodology into New York's Consolidated Laws is ill-advised.
The legislature should seriously reconsider the language of the pre-
sent draft because the Commission's Rule 702(b) proposal (i) is
based on a methodology that has been criticized effectively; (ii) is
at odds with the current national legal trend as evidenced by the
Daubert decision; (iii) does not reflect current trends in New York
State evidence law; and (iv) ignores the important goal of substan-
tive legal reform.
A. "General Acceptance:" Pro and Con
1. Support For the Frye Test. The Frye methodology gained
support, at least in part, because of the policy justifications that
have been raised in its favor. Some contend that "general accept-
ance" guarantees those most able to determine a process' reliabil-
ity, namely the scientists in the particular field, will have the "de-
terminative voice."46 Others argue that because the admissibility
decisions of trial judges differ, the Frye test, by minimizing indi-
vidual judges' subjectivity, promotes consistency in the judicial
process.47 Similarly, "general acceptance" is defended on the
45. Id. at 164. The comments of the drafters explicitly recognize Frye as the model for
the rule. Id. "Subdivision (b) continues present law, based upon Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), governing the admissibility of scientific matters and theories or
scientific procedures, tests, or experiments and their results." Id.
46. See Giannelli, Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 9, at 1207 (quoting United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); McCormick, Scientific Evidence,
supra note 9, at 884 (remarking that judges and juries do not have the technical capacity to
assess the reliability of techniques when scientists disagree); John D. Borders, Jr., Fit to be
Fryed: Frye v. United States and the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 77 Ky.
L.J. 849, 859 (1989).
In a related argument, supporters point to the test's implicit requirement that a "field
of experts" exists; they suggest that such a "field" ensures that a "minimal reserve" of
knowledgeable critics will be available to examine the scientific processes. Giannelli, Novel
Scientific Evidence, supra note 9, at 1207 (citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). See GREEN & NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
652 (1983).
47. MICHAEL M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.2, at 647 (3d ed.
1991); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at 362-63; Borders, supra note 46, at 859.
See Giannelli, Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 9, at 1207 (citing People v. Kelly, 549
1995]
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ground that it promotes efficiency by eliminating wasted time at
multiple "mini-trials" that would otherwise surround the admissi-
bility of scientific opinion.48  Finally, some supporters maintain
that Frye helps avoid the "mystic infallibility" that scientific evi-
dence possesses in the eyes of many jurors simply because the tes-
timony is given by experts.49
P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1970)). The Kelly court announced that the "primary advantage
• ..of the Frye test lies in its essentially conservative nature." 549 P.2d at 1245.
48. GRAHAM, supra note 47, at 632; Giannelli, Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 9,
at 1207 (citing Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (Md. 1978)); Borders, supra note 46, at
859.
49. GREEN & NESSON, supra note 46, at 652; see also Borders, supra note 46, at 859;
Giannelli, Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 9, at 1237 (citing United States v. Addison,
498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); Graham, supra note 47, at 632. See generally John E.B.
Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1, 10
(1989); Lori L. Swafford, Comment, Admissibility of DNA Genetic Profiling Evidence in
Criminal Proceedings: The Case for Caution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 123, 131 (1990). Cf. McCor-
mick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 9, at 884 (remarking that the reliability dispute over a
scientific technique would likely lead the lay jury away from the merits of the case).
Contemporary political discourse has seen the rise of a related justification, adherents
of which propose Frye as a solution to the problem of unsupported, unreliable scientific
theories having a bearing upon judicial outcomes. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE:
JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 199-204 (1991) [hereinafter HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE].
See Paul C. Giannelli, "Junk Science:" The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
105, 106 (1993). This position reached its zenith when, while serving as Vice President, Dan
Quayle established the Civil Justice Reform Task Force that advocated a "general accept-
ance" amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE,
AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA, reprinted in 60 CIN. L. REv. 979, 990 & 999
(1992). The proposed amendment was to include a requirement that opinion evidence be
inadmissible unless "the proffered witness' testimony is based on a widely accepted explana-
tory theory." Id. at 1025, 1049 (1992). President George Bush subsequently implemented
these changes by executive order, requiring that all government attorneys abide by Frye in
civil actions in which the United States was a party. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg.
55, 195 (1991).
The fear motivating opponents of this so-called "junk science" is that "charlatans" and
"brash scientific iconoclast[s]" will dupe judges and juries, thus making for errant judicial
results. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra, at 14. The main cause of these unwarranted
"junk science" awards is greed, id. at 39-56, and results in great harm to the national econ-
omy in the aggregate. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CON-
SEQUENCES (1988). Huber argues: "The number of tort suits filed has increased steadily for
over two decades. ..[as have awards,] the average size of [which have] grown more rapidly
still. Multiplied together, these trends produce the universal tort tax so pervasive in our
world today." Id. at 9. "Across the board," he concludes, "modern tort law weighs heavily on
the spirit of innovation and enterprise." Id. at 14. These proponents of Frye contend that
Federal Rule 702 is a "let-it-all-in" approach. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra, at 14-17.
The opponents of "junk science" view "general acceptance" as an important tool, "stiffening
the judge's spine and steeling his nerves" against unsupported opinion testimony. Id. at 14.
The Daubert decision and the logic underlying the law's movement away from Frye
undermine these arguments. First, "general acceptance" is not a particularly efficient meth-
odology given the difficulty judges have had in applying it. See infra part III.A.2. Second, as
part III.E., infra, demonstrates, the lack of uniformity that will reign if states continue to
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2. Critical Analysis. In spite of these justifications, the Frye rule
has been effectively criticized by judges and scholars who raise se-
rious questions about the test's efficacy.50 Foremost among its
problems, the "general acceptance" methodology tends to deprive
juries of relevant, reliable evidence s.5 By introducing a conservative
bias into the evidentiary process, the Frye test causes courts to
risk errant judgements by favoring science that is old and possibly
outmoded.52 These serious problems arise when effective, reliable
science is precluded at trial simply because a "lag-time" exists be-
tween a showing of the procedure's scientific validity and its "gen-
eral acceptance" in the field. s Also problematic is the manner in
which the test transfers the "legal" admissibility decision from the
judge, with whom it properly belongs, to the lay scientific commu-
nity.54 As one commentator observed, the Frye test does not ensure
use the outdated Frye rule is inefficient and counter-productive. Third, the logic underlying
Daubert is the proper response to fears of Mr. Huber's "bamboozlers" in the witness stand.
It is more proper to expose quack science with a showing that the theory has no underlying
scientific validity than to ask if some indeterminable number of scientists have heard of and
accepted the theory as accurate. See infra part III.C.
50. One commentator has written that the "condemnations of Frye have been of the
scattershot variety, hitting . . . everywhere, in a frenzied effort to cripple it." James E.
Starrs, "A Still-Life Watercolor": Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC Sci. 684, 685 (1982).
51. Paul C. Giannelli, Frye v. United States: Background Paper Prepared for the Na-
tional Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, 99 F.R.D. 189, 192 (1983) (citing Coppolino v.
State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968)) [hereinafter, Giannelli, Background Paper]; Edward
J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on Evaluat-
ing the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv 261, 265 (1981). See United
States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa 1974) (holding that "[t]he Frye test...
precludes too much relevant evidence for purposes of the fact determining process [in this]
hearing"); Steven M. Egesdal, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An
Empirical Evaluation, 74 GEo. L. J. 1769, 1771-73 (1986).
52. Faigman, supra note 11, at 1816; Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 265; Moenssens,
supra note 9, at 548.
53. Hanson, supra note 11, at 367; Giannelli, Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 9,
at 1223; Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 265; Michael J. Saks, Accuracy v. Advocacy: Expert
Testimony Before the Bench, TECH. REV., Aug.-Sept. 1987, at 46-7. One can imagine a new
scientific method being precluded at trial because, although it is highly reliable, the method
has not been in existence for a sufficiently long time to allow scientists in the field to accept
it generally. See Hanson, supra note 11, at 367.
54. Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound: It Should
Not be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991). But see Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935 (Wyo. 1983).
In Ortega, the Wyoming Supreme Court misread science and thus misused a precedent set
down in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Supreme Court
had permitted the warrantless taking of a blood sample from a defendant arrested for driv-
ing while intoxicated after recognizing the tendency of the blood's alcohol content, and thus
the proof of criminality, to dissipate quickly over time. Ortega, 669 P.2d at 942. The Ortega
court used the Schmerber reasoning to uphold a warrantless police seizure of blood evidence
at a crime scene although the blood's evidentiary value consisted only of blood typing, a
characteristic which does not dissipate over time. Id. This fundamental difference was either
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
evidentiary reliability, but merely reflects the "scientific wisdom of
the moment.""5
Aside from these problems, the procedural obstacles judges
have encountered when applying "general acceptance" have in-
vited other meaningful criticisms .5  First, judges have had diffi-
culty determining the percentage of agreement among experts that
should constitute a "general" acceptance. 5 An associated problem
is the subjectivity inherent in the decision a judge must make
when defining the "field" from which acceptance will be sought.5 8
Lastly, it is unclear whether Frye requires the judge to find "gen-
eral acceptance" in the testimony's scientific basis or merely in the
technique applying that basis."
Such criticisms cast doubt on the efficacy of the Commission's
suggestion that Frye be written into the consolidated laws. The
"general acceptance" language of proposed Rule 702(b) is particu-
larly problematic because scholars have indicated that the accom-
plishments for which Frye is hailed could be realized with a less
restrictive evidentiary standard.60 Furthermore, fairness and ra-
tionality demand that evidentiary reliability, and not some "nose
counting" scheme,61 should be the touchstone of the admissibility
decision.
missed or ignored by the court. But cf. Marconi Wireless Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that most
judges lack sufficient scientific knowledge to determine complex patent issues).
55. Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 115
F.R.D. 84, 86 (1987).
56. Giannelli, Background Paper, supra note 51, at 192-93. The "general acceptance"
test has been called "remarkably vague," WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 87; "undefi-
nable," Strong, supra note 9, at 14; and "not enlightening," MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 9, at 490.
57. GREEN & NEssON, supra note 46, at 661; Faigman, supra note 11, at 1816; Giannelli,
Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 9, at 1210-11; Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 265.
New York courts have also wrestled with this dilemma. See, e.g., People v. Middleton, 429
N.E.2d 100, 103 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that "the test is not whether a particular procedure is
unanimously endorsed by the scientific community, but whether it is generally acceptable as
reliable").
58. GREEN & NEssON, supra note 46, at 661; Faigman, supra note 11, at 1816; Giannelli,
Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 9, at 1208-10; Moenssens, supra note 9, at 549; Saks,
supra note 53, at 46. See also Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 265.
59. Giannelli, Background Paper, supra note 51, at 193 (citing NATONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 41 (1979)).
60. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at 873.
61. Referring to the Frye test as "nose counting" was popularized by the Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) ("A determination of
reliability cannot rest solely on a process of 'counting (scientific) noses.' "). Another pejora-
tive observation appears in WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 87 (stating that "the Frye
decision has all the earmarks of a 'sport' ").
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B. National Trend: The "Reliability" Approach
Faced with the necessity of proposing an alternative to the
Frye methodology, many scholars suggested a turn toward a "relia-
bility" approach. 2 Courts and scholars began to maintain that evi-
dentiary reliability, and not the austere Frye standard, had been
the standard intended by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence when Rule 702 was conceived.6 3 Like increasing numbers of
62. Changes proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States were circulated for public comment on August 15,
1991 and would have required expert testimony to be "reasonably reliable" in order to be
admissible at federal trials. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 83 (1991). See, e.g., Renee A. Forinash,
Analyzing Scientific Evidence: From Validity to Reliability with a Two-Step Approach, 24
ST. MARY'S L.J. 223 (1992); Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the
Lay Trier with the Comprehensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the Goals of
the Rules of Evidence, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 915 (1990); Lederer, supra note 55, at 84; McCor-
mick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 9, at 911-12; Moenssens, supra note 9, at 565.
In addition to the "reliability" approach, many scholars advocated adopting a "rele-
vancy" approach in the place of the Frye test. See, e.g., Leo M. Romero, The Admissibility
of Scientific Evidence under the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M. L.
REV. 187, 198 (1976); Strong, supra note 9, at 14. The concept of relevancy was popularized
in modem legal thought by Professor Charles McCormick. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 491 (2d
ed. 1972). It was Professor McCormick's opinion that "[a]ny relevant conclusions which are
supported by a qualified expert witness should be received" in evidence. Id. Under this
formulation, the cross-examination of experts in front of the trier of fact would ensure that
"junk science" was exposed. See GREEN & NEssON, supra note 46, at 662 (pointing to an
early case, United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975), in which the court applied
the McCormick relevancy logic. The Bailer court admitted voice spectrography evidence,
stating that "[u]nless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular tech-
nique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant
scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be
attacked by cross-examination and refutation." 519 F.2d at 466). Under the relevancy ap-
proach, disagreements among experts concerning the "reliability" of the underlying basis
would go to the weight, not to the admissibility, of the evidence. GREEN & NESSON, supra
note 46, at 662.
The relevancy approach has been assailed on the grounds that it is a "let-it-all-in" ap-
proach that permits "junk science" to enter the decisionmaking process in the courtroom.
Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1637, 1687 (1993). One commentator considered the reliability approach superior because
"[c]onclusions that lack predictability or replicability do not aid in the proper determina-
tion of triable issues. The [admissibility test] should eliminate the possibility of a jury rely-
ing on the incorrect, but persuasive, opinions of an articulate expert witness." Moenssens,
supra note 9, at 565. See also supra note 49.
63. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 16, 702[03] at 702-44
(1988). See also Moenssens, supra note 9, at 565-67 (describing the advisability of moving to
a reliability approach).
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state courts,6 4 United States Courts of Appeals began to reject the
Frye test in favor of the "reliability" approach thought to be de-
manded by the Federal Rules.6 5
The seminal "reliability" decision among the Courts of Ap-
peals came from the Third Circuit in United States v. Downing.06
Downing involved the appeal of a district court finding that certain
psychological expert testimony was inadmissible.6 In vacating the
district court finding, the appeals panel expressly rejected Frye
and substituted a "reliability" approach. 8
The Downing court announced a process that trial judges
would be expected to follow so as to avoid running afoul of Federal
Rule 702's "reliability" mandate.6 9 First, a threshold in limine
hearing was required in which the judge was ordered to ensure that
the proffered testimony was reliable."' The court cited several fac-
tors that could be considered as indicia of a theory's "reliability,"
including specialized writing, potential rates of error, and even
"general acceptance" within the field."' None of these factors, in
and of itself, however, was to be determinative of "reliability. '72
In addition to "reliability," the Court of Appeals required that
the expert testimony be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case
[so] that it [would] aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute. 7 3
To achieve this so-called "fit,"7 4 the party advocating admission of
64. E.g., Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1980) (rejecting Frye); Harper v.
State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (Ga. 1982) (same); State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 83-85 (Iowa
1980) (same); Brown v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Ky. 1982) (same); State v.
Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 980 (La. 1979) (same); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 503 (Me.
1978) (same); State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ohio 1983) (same); State v. Kersting,
623 P.2d 1095, 1101-02 (Or. 1981) (same).
65. E.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198, 2000 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978) (re-
jecting Frye and pointing to the liberal thrust of Rule 702); United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting Frye as inconsistent with Rule 702); United States
v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the Frye logic).
66. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 1226. The testimony sought to be admitted concerned the psychological fac-
tors that may make eyewitness identification unreliable. Id. For a full discussion of this
growing field, see Wayne W. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to the Jury
in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93 (1992).
68. 753 F.2d at 1226. In its test, the Downing court included not only reliability and fit,
but also the need for the judge to assure that the evidence did not unduly confuse or
prejudice the jury. Id. The court was cognizant of the possibility that a highly credentialed
expert witness might overwhelm a lay jury. Id. at 1239-41.
69. For a discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, see infra note 87.
70. 753 F.2d at 1241.
71. Id. at 1238-39.
72. Id. at 1238.
73. Id. at 1242.
74. Id.
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the evidence was required to make a detailed on-the-record state-
ment to the court explaining the specific ways in which the testi-
mony fit the facts sub judice.75
C. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
After Downing, the Third Circuit's view of Federal Rule 702
was at odds with other circuits that had remained moored to the
"general acceptance" language of Frye. 6 In response to this con-
flict,77 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.78 and resolved the controversy in the
1992 term.
1. Daubert: Factual Background. On November 1, 1989, a
United States District Court in Los Angeles granted summary
judgment to the defendants in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.79 The suit was based on birth defects al-
leged to have been caused by pre-natal ingestion of Bendectin, a
drug produced by the defendants.80 The motion for summary judg-
ment articulated the defendants' contention that the essential ele-
ment of causation was missing from plaintiffs' case because
Bendectin had not been shown to cause birth defects in humans.8'
As a consequence, both sides in the controversy introduced expert
testimony on that narrow scientific question.2
Both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed that the plaintiffs' expert evidence failed to meet the re-
quirements of the Frye standard.83 The movants' experts claimed
that no human statistical study had shown a causal link between
75. Id.
76. United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
77. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2792-93 (1993)
(observing that "[a]lIthough under increasing attack of late, the [Frye] rule continues to be
followed by a majority of courts").
78. 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
79. 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
80. 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791 (1993). Bendectin was a pregnancy anti-nausea drug produced
and marketed by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals from 1957 until 1983. Bert Black, A Unified
Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 679 (1988). Jason Daubert was born
with reduced-limb birth defects alleged to have been caused by his mother's use of Merrell
Dow's product while she carried him in vivo. 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
81. 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2792. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had accepted and applied the Frye
methodology in the case of United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Bendectin and birth defects.8 4 The plaintiffs responded with the
testimonies of eight experts who, by relying on novel human,
animal, and chemical studies, claimed to have found a positive
link. 5 Both courts found that the plaintiffs' novel data and analy-
ses had failed to gain "general acceptance" within the medical field
and were therefore inadmissible."'
2. A New Admissibility Test: "Reliability" and "Fit." The
Supreme Court's resolution of Daubert produced a finding that
Federal Rule 702, and not Frye, articulated the proper standard
for judging the admissibility of expert testimony in federal trials.8 7
A unanimous Court held that the "general acceptance" standard
had not been codified by Congress in its 1975 enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 A majority of the Court interpreted
Rule 702 to require that, as a threshold matter,89 trial judges must
find, not "general acceptance," but instead "reliability" and a
84. 113 S. Ct. at 2791. Defendants' expert, Dr. Steven H. Lamm, claimed to have ex-
amined every study concerning Bendectin's teratogenicity (tendency to cause birth defects).
Id. In over thirty studies examined, the expert could find no data showing a link between
the drug and human defects. Id.
85. Id. at 2791-92. This evidence was particularly important to the plaintiffs' case given
the history of Bendectin's treatment in federal courts. See generally In re Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985),
aff'd sub noma, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding no causation in a consolidated hearing
covering over 1,100 cases of alleged birth defects). For a full discussion of the Bendectin
litigation, see Michael C. McCarthy, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the
Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 And 703, 77 CORNELL
L. REv. 350, 366-81 (1992).
86. 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
87. Id. at 2793. Federal Rule 702, entitled "Testimony by Experts," requires that "[i]f
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702. For a full discussion of the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, see Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 53 OIo ST. L.J. 1307 (1992).
The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Rules of Evidence are dominant and
"occupy the field." See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). But see Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
88. 113 S. Ct. at 2794. The majority opinion, penned by Justice Blackmun, was joined
by six justices. Id. at 2791. Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Stevens joined, concurred
with the majority in their holding that the standard required by the Federal Rules was not a
wholesale reflection of the Frye logic. Id. at 2799.
89. Id. at 2796. The Court required that a preliminary determination was necessary
under Federal Rule 104(a). That rule requires that "[p]reliminary questions concerning...
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court." FED. R. EVID. 104(a). This
requirement closely parallels the Downing court's mandated in limine hearing in which the
trial judge was to engage in a threshold determination when deciding whether evidence is
admissible. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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proper "fit" before expert testimony may be admitted.90 For all in-
tents and purposes, Frye was dead in federal courts.9'
The Court developed the first prong of the Daubert test, "reli-
ability," through a plain meaning analysis of the Federal Rules.92
Federal Rule 702 mandates that expert testimony be based on "sci-
entific ... knowledge."9' 3 The Court read the term "scientific" to
require that reliable testimony must be grounded in the "methods
and procedures of science."9 4 Reliable "knowledge" was condi-
tioned on the showing that the expert's opinion was based on more
than the expert's mere "subjective belief or unsupported
speculation. '9 5
"Fit," the second prong of the Daubert test, was likewise the
product of a plain meaning analysis of the Federal Rules.96 The
majority found that in order to meet Rule 702's mandate that ex-
pert testimony "assist the trier of fact, '9 7 the evidence must relate
directly to an issue in the case.98 If the basis of an expert's testi-
mony cannot be "properly . . . applied to the facts in issue," the
evidence will be inadmissible.99 At bottom, "fit" is essentially a
90. 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens dissented from the majority's
finding that "reliability" and "fit" are the touchstones of admissibility. Id. at 2799-800.
91. Id. at 2794 (stating that "the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is
unconvincing").
92. Id. at 2795. For a full discussion of the advent of "plain meaning" analysis of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, see Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of
Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need
for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revi-
sion of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992). For a discussion of the "plain mean-
ing" analysis as applied in Daubert specifically, see Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1999, 2018-19 (1994).
93. FED. R. EVID. 702. The Court said that "in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,'
an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method." 113 S. Ct. at 2795. The
scientific method is "[a] research method characterized by the definition of a problem, the
gathering of data, and the drafting and empirical testing of the hypothesis." THE LIVING
WEBSTER ENCYCLOPEDIC DiCrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 859 (1st ed. 1971). For a full
discussion of the use of the scientific method in legal contexts, see Bert Black, A Unified
Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988).
The Court stressed that Rule 702's definition of evidentiary reliability is closely akin to
the concept of scientific validity. 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.9. The Court noted that "scientists
typically distinguish between 'validity' (does the principle support what it purports to
show?) and 'reliability' (does application of the principle produce consistent results?)." Id.
In this context, evidentiary reliability would not equate with scientific reliability. Id.
94. 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2795-96. This requirement is identical to the "fit" demanded by the Downing
court. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985).
97. FED. R. EVID. 702.
98. 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
99. Id.
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"relevancy" requirement.100
. In order to assist the lower courts in applying the admittedly
flexible new test, the Court offered four factors judges might weigh
in determining admissibility. 101 First, the Court suggested that the
results from testing will often be indicative of reliability. 102 Second,
in recognition of the value that peer review brings to scientific
knowledge, the Court recommended that judges look to a theory's
publication in scientific journals.103 Third, the Court noted that re-
liability can be signified by favorable rates of error and reputable
standards of measurability underlying the expert's evidence. 10 4
Fourth, the Court retained a place for "general acceptance" in the
overall calculus, announcing that it too may be indicative of relia-
ble testimony. 0
5
3. A Model for Applying the Daubert Methodology. Because
some trial courts in New York State are using a Daubert-like ad-
missibility standard, 106 it is instructive for comparison purposes to
examine the treatment Daubert has been given in lower federal
courts. In Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,' 07 a mother
and child sued the manufacturer of "Retin-A" acne cream in prod-
ucts tort, alleging that the mother's pre-natal use of the product
had caused the infant birth defects. 08 The defendant manufac-
100. FED. R. EVID. 402. For a thorough examination of the "fit" requirement, see Clif-
ton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Rede-
fining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
1875, 1912-17 (1994).
101. 113 S. Ct. at 2796. These "general observations" by the Court were not intended to
be a checklist, nor were they intended to be exhaustive. Id.
102. Id. at 2796-97. For an analysis of the "testing" criterion, see David E. Bernstein,
The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence after Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2153-54 (1994); Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 100, at
1887-95.
103. 113 S. Ct. at 2797. For an analysis of peer review, see Bernstein, supra note 102, at
2150-53; Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 100, at 1900-05.
104. 113 S. Ct. at 2797. An analysis of the error standard can be found in Hutchinson &
Ashby, supra note 100, at 1895-900.
105. 113 S. Ct. at 2797. The Court rejected the exclusive use of the "general accept-
ance" test for determining whether scientific expert testimony would be admissible, stating
that the Frye test, an "austere standard, absent from and incompatible with the Federal
Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials." Id. at 2794.
In addition to these four factors, the Court reiterated the "flexible" nature of the Rule
702 analysis and made passing reference to "different set[s] of factors." Id. at 2797 & n.12.
106. For a full treatment of these New York cases, see infra part III.D.
107. 832 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Fla. 1993). For another well reasoned and informative ap-
plication of the Daubert methodology, see United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554-66 (6th
Cir. 1993).
108. 832 F. Supp. at 342. The birth defects consisted of an imperforate anus, bowl
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turer moved for summary judgement, claiming that the plaintiffs
had failed to show a causal link between Retin-A and the
defects.'
In granting the defendant's motion, Judge Ryskamp found the
testimony of the plaintiffs' sole expert inadmissible. 10 The expert,
Dr. Bertman, M.D., was an obstetrician/gynecologist with no spe-
cialized training in teratology."' Nonetheless, the doctor testified
that Retin-A was a teratogen (i.e., that it causes birth defects). 112
The Chikovsky court relied on Daubert to find that the doc-
tor's testimony was inadmissible because it lacked both "reliabil-
ity" and "fit." 113 Looking to the four factors cited in Daubert,
Judge Ryskamp first determined that, because Dr. Bertman was
unable to point to any publications showing a causal connection
between Retin-A and birth defects, the reliability of the testimony
was undermined by the lack of peer review." 4 The expert's failure
to produce any causation data also led the court to determine that
the testimony, unsupported by tests or rates of error, lacked the
necessary indicia of reliability. 115 Judge Ryskamp declined to ex-
amine the "general acceptance" factor cited by the Daubert Court
because no evidence of the theory's acceptance in the relevant
community had been presented.116 Insofar as "fit" was concerned,
the court considered as determinative the lack of any showing that
topically-applied Retin-A was absorbed at high levels through the
skin of pregnant women.'" The plaintiff's evidence was therefore
insufficient to show that Dr. Bertman's testimony was relevant to
the facts in the Chikovsky case."'
shaped, folded ears that lacked rims, and overlapping, bifurcated toes. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 346. In the face of plaintiff's non-evidence, the defendant was entitled to
summary judgement on the grounds that its admissible expert testimony was sufficient to
show that there existed no genuine issue of material fact under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 56. Id. at 342-44.
111. Id. at 345. The court also noted that two of the original three experts employed by
the plaintiff had been dismissed because the first, Dr. Benke, had testified that no causal
connection existed while the testimony of the second, Dr. Mash, was considered by the
plaintiff to be irrelevant. Id. at 344.
112. Id. at 345. Dr. Bertman based the.opinion on studies that had shown birth defects
resulting from large doses of vitamin A (the active ingredient of Retin-A) and analogies to
Accutane, another vitamin A-based acne medicine that had been tied to birth defects. Id. at
345-46.
113. Id. at 344.
114. Id. at 345.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 345 n.6.
117. Id. at 345-46.
118. Because the Downing test is closely akin to that in Daubert, the treatment United
States v. Downing was given on remand is also an enlightening illustration of Daubert's
1995]
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4. Daubert's Nationwide Impact. Cases like Chikovsky show
that Daubert heralds a significant change in American evidence ju-
risprudence and is a methodology that will become increasingly
popular, at least in part, because of its universal application in fed-
eral courts." 9 The two-pronged Daubert analysis will be used by
federal judges across the United States, including those in New
York's Second Circuit, and will exert a strong influence on bench
and bar nationwide. In addition, high courts in states across the
country have begun to embrace Daubert as the operative admissi-
bility test when faced with novel science. 20 It seems misguided at
likely application. On remand, Judge Weiner, like Judge Ryskamp in Chikovsky, held an in
limine hearing where documentary evidence, data, and verbal testimonies were presented.
United States v. Downing, 609 F. Supp. 784, 785-89 (E.D. Pa. 1985). First, the judge found
that the psychological evidence offered to refute the veracity of eyewitness identification
lacked reliability. Id. at 790-91. Applying the Court of Appeals' "reliability" factors, Judge
Weiner found that the absence of methodology evidence, an inadequate amount of raw data,
and several reports showing uncertainty and error were all indicative of the testimony's un-
reliable scientific basis. Id. Moreover, the judge found that the evidence failed to show the
required "fit." Id. at 792. The judge pointed to three major differences between the manner
in which the subjects in the studies were tested and the situation faced by the eyewitnesses
in this prosecution: while the subjects had been tested only for eleven month time spans, the
actual span between the witnessed event and the eyewitness testimony in Downing was
three years; while the studies had only tested subjects exposed to stimuli for one minute, the
Downing eyewitnesses had seen the defendant for between five and forty-five minutes; and
while the studies tested subjects exposed to violent, stressful crimes, the crime in this case
was mail fraud and, as such, did not expose the eyewitnesses to the stress that might other-
wise interfere with their perception. Id. Because the psychological studies did not fit the
facts of the case, the judge found that testimony based on them would not be helpful to the
trier of fact. Id.
119. See Rorie Sherman, 'Junk Science' Rule Used Broadly, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 4, 1993,
at 3. The article chronicles the wide uses to which the Daubert methodology is being put,
including judges stretching the test's limits beyond scientific testimony to such non-scien-
tific disciplines as accounting and economics. Id.
120. Some states have expressly adopted Daubert as the controlling definition of their
federally-based state rules of evidence. Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 73-74 (Del. 1993) (fol-
lowing Daubert and rejecting Frye in favor of a "reliability" interpretation of the state evi-
dence code); Hutchinson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa
1994) (accepting the Daubert decision as a re-affirmation of the state's rejection of Frye and
long-standing interpretation of its evidence code); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La.
1993) (accepting the Daubert logic and observations as definitive rulings on tV - meaning of
the state evidence code); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 202-03 (N.M. 1993) (following
Daubert and rejecting Frye in favor of a "reliability" interpretation of the state evidence
code); City of Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, 705 (N.D. 1994) (accepting the
Daubert decision as an affirmation of the state's rejection of Frye when interpreting its
evidence code); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 484 (S.D. 1994) (following Daubert in judg-
ing the admissibility of scientific testimony); Reese v. Stroh, 874 P.2d 200, 204 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994) (recognizing Daubert as the controlling definition of the state's evidence rules in
civil trials). But cf. Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993) (voicing an inten-
tion to continue to apply the Frye methodology in the face of Daubert).
In other states, litigants have begun the process of change by arguing that their state's
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best to propose that New York's Legislature should buck the trend
away from "general acceptance" and enact proposed Rule 702(b).
D. State Trend: New York Moves Away From Frye
In addition to ignoring the national movement away from
Frye, the drafters of proposed Rule 702(b) disregarded the trend
away from "general acceptance" that has begun in New York
courts. The goal of the rule's drafters is clear: to "codify[ ] existing
New York law unless there is a consensus for change."' 21 Although
"general acceptance" is the stated rule of the New York Court of
Appeals, 122 a careful study shows an "existing" motion away from
Frye in both trial and appellate courts in the state.' 2 Recent case
law demonstrates that some New York courts have been at odds
with, and have even implicitly rejected, the exclusive use of "gen-
eral acceptance." While it is true that a majority of New York ju-
risdictions continue to adhere and cite to Frye, other state courts
have cast doubt on the test's long-term viability by declining to
adopt the "general acceptance" logic. Two notable classes of cases
in which Frye has been abandoned are those arising from a civil
cause of action and those in which expert testimony is based on
evidence codes demand a shift to a Daubert-based methodology. See, e.g., Jones v. State,
862 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Ark. 1993) (referring to defendant/appellant advocating the recogni-
tion of Daubert); People v. Webb, 862 P.2d 779, 798 n.22 (Cal. 1993) (referring to the Cali-
fornia Attorney General's position that the state's "general acceptance" test should be reex-
amined in light of Daubert); State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, 585 n.3 (Minn. 1994)
(noting the state's position that the Frye rule should be abandoned in favor of the Daubert
criteria); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Mo. 1993) (referring to
both parties' arguments that the facts sub judice fit the Daubert criteria). At the writing of
this Comment, California's Supreme Court is in the midst of deciding whether to abandon
the Frye methodology in favor of the Daubert formulation. Richard Paddock, Court Hears
Case Pivotal to DNA Tests, L. A. TImEs, August 31, 1994, at B1.
121. Michael Martin, supra note 38, at 71.
122. See supra part I.B. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 134 (N.Y. 1990)
(citing to Frye as controlling precedent when judging the admissibility of rape trauma
syndrome).
123. For an enunciation of the discomfort some New York State jurists have with the
"general acceptance" test, see People v. Mooney, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye,
J., dissenting). But see People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 461 (N.Y. 1994) (Kaye, C.J., con-
curring) (agreeing with the majority that "where the scientific evidence sought to be
presented is novel, the test is that articulated in Frye").
In the Court of Appeals Wesley opinion, discussed supra, at part I.B., the majority
went beyond the classic "general acceptance" language of Frye: "It should be noted that
... the modern trend in the law of evidence has been away from imposing a special test on
scientific evidence and toward using the 'traditional standards of relevancy and the need for
expertise.'" Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 456 (citing 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203, at 873-74
(4th ed. 1992)).
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the "soft sciences. 1 24
1. The Civil Cause of Action. Some motion has been seen in
New York courts toward rejecting the Frye methodology in favor
of a reliability standard when the novel- scientific evidence is
presented in a civil proceeding. In support, judges have stressed
the fact that a lower burden of persuasion is required in civil as
compared to criminal actions.125  In criminal proceedings, the
prejudice inherent in expert testimony is often sufficient to exclude
the evidence from trial. 2 ' Arguments underlying the civil-case dis-
tinction stress that prejudice is less likely to produce errant results
in the civil setting than it is at criminal trial.127
124. See infra parts III.D.1 & 2.
125. While criminal proceedings require persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt, civil
proceedings require persuasion by a mere preponderance of the evidence. In re E.M., 520
N.Y.S.2d 327, 332 (Fain. Ct. 1987); Reese v. Stroh, 874 P.2d 200, 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
In In re E.M., called "the leading case in [its] jurisdiction on the subject of appropriate
methodology in child abuse validations," Eli v. Eli, 607 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Fain. Ct. 1993), Judge
Jurow observed that "[r]egardless of the complexities concerning the admissibility of evi-
dence derived from scientific testing, . . . whether under a Frye standard or otherwise, an
overriding point to remember is that Family Court child protective proceedings are civil,
rather than criminal, in nature and that it is therefore appropriate to err on the side of
admissibility . . . when it comes to the introduction of evidence derived from new clinical
testing techniques." 520 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
126. In re E.M., 520 N.Y.S.2d at 332; Reese, 874 P.2d at 204. Cf. People v. Collins, 438
P.2d 33, 41 (Cal. 1968) (explaining why a searching, critical examination of novel evidence is
necessary at the criminal trial "in view of the substantial unfairness to a defendant which
may result from ill conceived techniques with which the trier of fact is not technically
equipped to cope"); People v. Law, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (same).
While the lesser quantum of proof in the civil trial has been used to justify a relaxation of
Frye's strict mandates, it does not appear that the reliability test espoused by the Daubert
court would fail to meet the protections due criminal defendants.
127. In re E.M., 520 N.Y.S.2d at 332; In re Meyer, 504 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (Fam. Ct.
1986); Reese, 874 P.2d at 204. In Meyer, Judge Gallet observed that the reasons for exclud-
ing evidence under the Frye methodology are weaker in civil trials than they are in criminal
proceedings. The judge believed a more liberal standard was appropriate in the civil context
because of the lower burden of persuasion, the more relaxed rules of evidence, and the ab-
sence of a jury in certain civil trials as compared to their criminal counterpart. Meyer, 504
N.Y.S.2d at 360. In Reese, the court pointed to three policy reasons that counsel toward a
rejection of Frye's use in civil cases. First, Frye was developed to deal with the uncertainty
surrounding "black box" technologies, those which are mechanical and mysteriously produce
answers without the jury knowing how or why. Reese, 874 P.2d at 205 (citing People v. Stoll,
783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989) and People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984)). Second, there
is a fear that novel scientific evidence may be given undue weight by a jury and thus lead, if
unfounded, to an erroneous conviction. Id. at 205 (citing People v. Law, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708
(Cal. Ct. App. 1974)). Third, the defendant's constitutionally-mandated right to a fair crimi-
nal trial makes the efficacy of scientific evidence particularly important. Id. at 205 (citing
Law, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 708). Again, however, it does not appear that the reliability test
espoused by the Daubert Court would fail to meet the protections due criminal defendants.
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The admission of polygraph evidence in civil child protective
proceedings presents one example of New York judicial decisions
made outside the periphery of Frye.12 s Historically, expert testi-
mony based on the lie detector has been found to lack "general
acceptance" in the scientific field by New York courts, thus render-
ing the technology inadmissible.1 2 Despite this fact, the court in
In re Meyer 30 admitted testimony based on the device.' 31 The
opinion, which did not mention Frye or the "general acceptance"
methodology, relied instead upon peer review, testing, and the
technology's validity."2 As in Daubert, the Meyer court was con-
cerned with the polygraph's reliability and the "fit" of the
evidence.'
2. "Soft" Science. Other New York courts have recognized
that the Frye methodology may not be applicable when the expert
testimony is based upon the "soft" sciences. 3 4 "Soft" science is
considered to be that body of knowledge that is based on the social
128. Civil child protective proceedings and controlled by the Family Court Act. N.Y.
FAM. CT. AcT § 1046 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994).
129. See People v. Leone, 255 N.E.2d 696, 699-700 (N.Y. 1969) (finding that the poly-
graph had not reached "general acceptance"); People v. Forte, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (N.Y. 1938);
People v. Vinson, 428 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834-35 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
130. 504 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
131. Id. at 361. Other New York courts have admitted the polygraph into evidence de-
spite the ruling by the Court of Appeals in Forte that the device has not gained general
acceptance. See People v. Daniels, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Zinn v. Bernic Con-
struction, 416 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Walther v. O'Connell, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Civ.
Ct. 1972); In re Stenzel, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Fain. Ct. 1972). State appellate courts have also
affirmed the admissibility of polygraph evidence in their review of administrative hearings.
May v. Shaw, 434 N.Y.S.2d 284, 285 (App. Div. 1981).
Interestingly, a New York court also eschewed the Frye criteria and admitted polygraph
evidence in a criminal trial. People v. Daniels, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1979). The court
said that "[tio require general acceptance would in essence mandate absolute infallibility.
Instead, a court should weigh and consider the admissibility of polygraph results in the
same manner it makes other decisions relating to admissibility of any evidence." Id. at 837.
The court went on to consider the relevance and probative value of the evidence. Id. at 837-
38.
132. In re Meyer, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (citing factual material, a peer review article, and
the affidavits of two polygraphers and a scholar as evidence in support of admissibility).
133. Id. at 360-61 (stating that "the polygraph evidence being offered appears no less
reliable or helpful than the psychiatric and psychological 'validation' evidence which is find-
ing wide acceptance in child protective proceedings .... Along with the myriad of other
'soft evidence' admitted in child protective proceedings, the polygraph evidence may be as-
signed an appropriate weight under the circumstances") (emphasis added).
134. New York courts adhere to the Frye methodology when judging the admissibility
of expert testimony based on the "hard" sciences. E.g., People v. Burton, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972,
973 (Sup. Ct. 1992). See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
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sciences, including psychology and the study of syndromes. 135
Judges in New York have recognized that the Frye test was devel-
oped for the "hard" sciences and has only lately been applied to
psychological and social science theories.13 According to one court,
"[w]hether the Frye test should apply to 'soft' scientific evidence
. . . is yet an open questioh."M 37
In In re E.M., s8 a court faced with "soft" scientific evidence
applied an admissibility standard that is much more like the test
used in Daubert than the classic "general acceptance" methodol-
ogy. The case centered on whether psychological expert testimony
could be admitted to validate the hearsay statements made by a
child who claimed to have been abused.'39 Faced with this evi-
dence, the court outlined a three part "reliability" standard to de-
termine the testimony's admissibility. 140 Like the majority in
Daubert, the In re E.M. court required both scientific "validity"
and "fit" before it would admit testimony based on this "soft"
science.'
135. For a discussion of "soft" sciences, see McCord, supra note 9, at 29. The "hard"
sciences are those that are characterized by devices or technology, such as the polygraph,
DNA fingerprinting, or chemistry generally. Id. at 30. McCord refers to psychology as a
"hybrid" of "soft" and "hard" disciplines: it is based upon medicine, an avowedly "hard"
science, but also on the "soft" social sciences. Id. at 29-30.
Psychology has long been considered to be somewhat "less" of a science than other
disciplines. See, e.g., William James, A Plea for Psychology as a Natural Science, in COL-
LECTED ESSAYS AND REVIEWS 316-17 (1920). James states, "I have never claimed . . . that
psychology as it stands to-day is a natural science, or in an exact way a science at all . . . I
wished, by treating Psychology like a natural science, to help her to become one." Id.
136. People v. Mooney, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 n.1 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting);
People v. Burton, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973 n.2 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
137. Burton, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
138. 520 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
139. Id. at 330. The Family Court Act provides that "previous statements made by the
child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence, but if
uncorroborated, such statements shall not be sufficient to make a fact-finding of abuse or
neglect." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vi) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994).
Psychological validation evidence includes the use of anatomically correct dolls or the
interviewing of a child for signs such as unusual anger or a mature knowledge of sexual
practices. In re E.M., 520 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
140. In re E.M., 520 N.Y.S.2d at 331. The court did suggest that the Frye standard
remains operative in New York, but refers to the "general acceptance" formulation in Peo-
ple v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 1983), that centered on evidentiary reliability. Id. For
the balance of the E.M. decision, the court was concerned with the reliability and fit of the
evidence, not on its general acceptance in the scientific community.
141. In re E.M., 520 N.Y.S.2d at 331-32. The court stated that "the reliability of evi-
dence derived from a scientific principle depends upon three factors: (1) the validity of the
underlying principle; (2) the validity of the technique applying that principle; and (3) the
proper application of the technique on a particular occasion. . . ." Id. at 331. With respect
to the "fit" criteria of prong (3), the court cautioned that the underlying basis for the evi-
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E. Uniformity: An Advantage of Accepting Daubert
The General Assembly would be mistaken to implant Frye
into the consolidated laws because, by ignoring national and state
trends, it would eschew New York's opportunity to realize the ad-
vantages that uniformity would bring to the state's evidence law.
142
Statutory uniformity can be divided into two conceptual catego-
ries: intrastate uniformity and interstate uniformity. 143 Intrastate
uniformity, aimed at achieving consistency among the various lo-
calities within a state, would be best accomplished by establishing
one unified code of evidence to supplant the current hodgepodge of
local rules used by different courts across New York State.14 4 Al-
though the adoption of Rule 702(b) as currently proposed would
satisfy this intrastate goal, interstate uniformity would go
unfulfilled.
Interstate uniformity, aimed at harmonizing a state's law with
the law prevailing in the nation, is a worthy goal that the New
York legislature would be mistaken to ignore. By adopting the
Daubert relevancy rule now embodied in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the legislature could harmonize New York's law with the
federal code and, by extension, a substantial majority of state
codes. 45 Attaining interstate uniformity is particularly important
given the purposes outlined by the Law Revision Commission in
Rule 102: the drafters stated that the overall aim of New York's
proposed code of evidence is to secure fairness, eliminate unjustifi-
able expense and delay, and promote progress."4 Because of the
disparate treatment novel, valid science would receive in Second
Circuit as compared to New York State courts, fairness would be
ill-served by the non-uniform system that would result from the
codification of proposed Rule 702(b). 47
dence must not only be properly analyzed, but must also be relevant. Id. at 332.
142. Although these uniformity arguments are applied by scholars in support of adop-
tion of complete evidence codes reflecting the form and spirit of the Federal Rules, the
arguments are applicable to individual rules as well.
143. See Salken, supra note 33, at 668.
144. Id.
145. Evidence codes based on the Federal Rules of Evidence have been adopted by
thirty-four states. Salken, supra note 33, at 699.
146. THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 6 (1991).
147. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros
and Cons, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 293, 299-300 (1990). Graham points to the Erie problems that
arise when federal courts try diversity cases and apply state laws in federal courts. Id. Gra-
ham maintains that the current conflicts-of-law regimen is inadequate to solve the fairness
problems that can result. Id. at 300 (citing 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5435).
The "general acceptance" and "reliability" methodologies have often led federal and
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The legislature's adoption of "general acceptance" would also
thwart the efficiency and progress goals of Rule 102. A Frye-based
test, being out of step with the national "reliability" trend, would
eliminate the New York bar's ability to take advantage of jurispru-
dential economies of scale: attorneys and judges would be less able
to learn from the opinions of courts in other jurisdictions when
facing novel evidentiary questions. 48 Moreover, Rule 102's plain
language would be frustrated by enacting a Frye-based test that is
anachronistic and clearly unprogressive.
In addition to the purposes set forth in Rule 102, interstate
uniformity serves other worthwhile ends. First, uniform rules
would be less complicated to teach in the "national law schools"
that predominate in New York and across the United States. 149
Uniformity would also heighten efficiency by allowing practitioners
to more easily operate in both federal and state fora within New
York.15 0 In an increasingly interdependent economy, uniformity
also would reduce transaction costs to entities with national inter-
ests' 51 and those like insurance companies which have a need to
predict litigation outcomes. 5 2 Similarly, the costs of legal service
would be reduced by a uniform system that erected fewer barriers
to students and lawyers who wished to move across state lines.11 3
Finally, because states across the country have decided to join the
trend toward uniformity, the legitimacy of New York law would be
dampened by remaining moored to the anachronistic Frye rule. 5 4
state courts to reach different admissibility results on identical scientific techniques, For
example, federal and state courts in New York City were treating voice spectrographic anal-
ysis testimony differently in 1978. Compare, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194
(2d Cir. 1978) (finding voice spectrography admissible because, despite its failure to gain
generally acceptance, the technology was reliable), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979) with
People v. Collins, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding voice spectrographic analysis
inadmissible due to its failure to gain general acceptance).
148. See Graham, supra note 147, at 299-300.
149. See Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining
the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 257 (1984); Graham, supra note 147, at
296; Salken, supra note 33, at 667-68.
150. Salken, supra note 33, at 668-70; see Graham, supra note 147, at 296-97; L. Kivin
Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Perspective, 30 VILL. L.
REV. 1315, 1322 (1985).
151. Graham, supra note 147, at 297-98. "National" corporations are only one such en-
tity that would benefit from a uniform evidence regimen.
152. See id. at 300.
153. See id.; Wroth, supra note 150, at 1322.
154. See Graham, supra note 147, at 300-01. According to Graham,
Courts and legal scholars can express [their need for uniformity] in terms of the
legitimacy of the rules. It is much more difficult to convince the laity that [an
evidence rule] embodies some immutable principle of justice when just across the
state line courts are dispensing justice under [another rule] that is 180 degrees out
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F. Reforming the Substantive Law
In addition to reflecting actual legal trends, the codification
effort has a greater goal: reforming the substantive law.155 Due to
the common law character of New York's evidence law, meaningful
reform is often difficult. Not only are reform-minded judges lim-
ited by the piecemeal fashion in which controversies are presented
for resolution,'156 but courts will often refuse to act even when they
realize that a rule is obsolete and indefensible.
57
The need for meaningful statutory reform was recognized by
the Law Revision Commission when it outlined its proposed
changes from New York's common law evidence underpinnings. In
the words of the Commission, the reforms it included in the propo-
sal 1 58 were designed to "modernize" the law, "assure reliability" in
the law, and "gently push the law along its path.' ' 5 9 The General
Assembly would be well-advised to recognize that these three re-
form goals would be best served by abandoning the Frye standard
in favor of a "reliability" approach.
A "reliability" approach would be a better means of
"moderniz[ing]" and "assur[ing] reliability" in New York law than
would a blanket codification of the "general acceptance" standard.
An adoption of Frye, based on an old and outmoded methodology,
would not only fail to update the state's evidence law, it would
actually turn the clock back on courts such as those in In re E.M
and In re Meyer that have begun to modernize toward a Daubert-
like approach. Codification of Rule 702(b) would also do little to
assure reliability: there can be little doubt that the Daubert test,
turning as it does upon peer review and testing of the bases of sci-
of phase with the local version. Just as editorialists in [California] were able to
convince the electorate that democracy would collapse if some people voted their
ballots in a language other than English, so it is possible to argue that the Repub-
lic will collapse if lawyers are not all speaking Wigmore when discussing evidence.
Id. at 301.
155. For a full discussion of the responsibility of the drafters toward reform, see Salken,
supra note 33, at 672-81.
156. Id. at 672-73 (citing Loschiavo v. Port Auth., 448 N.E.2d 1351 (N.Y. 1983)).
157. Id. at 672.
158. Compare, e.g., THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE
FOR THE STATE OF NEw YORK § 607(b) (1991) (eliminating the common law "voucher rule"
that restricted a defendant's ability to impeach the credibility of his or her own witnesses)
with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 670.10 (McKinney 1992) (narrowing the defendant's ability to
impeach the credibility of his or her own witnesses). See People v. Phan, 568 N.Y.S.2d 498,
501 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
159. Letter from Robert M. Pitler, Law Revision Commission, to Governor Mario M.
Cuomo (March 21, 1991), in THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EvI-
DENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK at xviii, xix (1991). The Commission also referred to the
aim of clarifying the law, a goal that would be served by any codification. Id.
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entific testimony, is a better indicator of a technique's reliability
than is Frye's simplistic "nose counting" methodology.
One can also argue that the General Assembly's affirmation of
a "reliability" approach would give a mere "gentle push" to New
York's law along its present path. The cases In re E.M. and In re
Meyer16 0 demonstrate that New York evidence law has begun to
move away from the "general acceptance" methodology. Addition-
ally, a "reliability" test is not inconsistent with the rationale the
Court of Appeals regularly uses in deciding the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony. In People v. Leone,16 . one of the seminal modern
Court of Appeals cases on the subject, the court couched its admis-
sibility determination in terms of "reliability" as much as it did in
the language of "general acceptance."16 2 Leone is regularly cited as
authority in Court of Appeals decisions that refer to the New York
admissibility test as one requiring that the technique be "generally
accepted as reliable.' 63 One may rationally argue that the proper
rule to be distilled from these cases teaches that "reliability" is the
evidentiary goal, and that "general acceptance" is but a means to
it. Because the Court of Appeals' logic supports placing more
credence in "reliability" than in Frye, a move away from "general
acceptance" would be neither a sudden nor a profound shift in
New York's evidence law.
IV. WHAT THE RULE SHOULD LOOK LIKE: MODEL LEGISLATION
In place of the current "general acceptance" language of pro-
posed Rule 702(b), the New York General Assembly would be well-
advised to consider a rule incorporating the "reliability" approach.
160. See infra part III.D.
161. 255 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. 1969).
162. In finding that polygraph-based testimony was inadmissible, the Court of Appeals
referred to the reliability of the technology. "For many years instruments to detect decep-
tion have been used in industry with increasing frequency, but we have held their reliability
has not yet been sufficiently established to give them an evidentiary standing in the admin-
istration of the criminal law." Id. at 697. "It is claimed that in the hands of a qualified
examiner the machine is extremely reliable." Id. at 698. "Applying [the general acceptance]
standard, it is clear that the record before us does not adequately establish the reliability of
the tests to be admissible in evidence." Id. at 700.
163. E.g., People v. Hults, 556 N.E.2d 1077, 1080-81 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Hughes, 453
N.E.2d 484, 490 (N.Y. 1983) (emphasis added).
The current proposal for 702(b) reflects this fact. The Rule occasions admissibility upon
a finding that "there is general acceptance within the relevant scientific community of the
validity of the theory ... [and] there is general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community that the procedure, test, or experiment is reliable." THE NEW YORK STATE LAW
REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 162 (1991) (emphasis
added).
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The legislature is not, of course, bound by the language of the
draft and can make significant changes to the substance of the pro-
posal.164 To provide a "reliability" rule for expert scientific testi-
mony in New York, the legislature should re-write the current
draft rule to make "reliability" the operative standard.
A legislative re-draft of Rule 702(b) would be best accom-
plished within the form of the present proposal. The substance of
the change would replace the "general acceptance" vocabulary in
702(b) with language that shows the General Assembly's explicit
intent to make "reliability" the operative test for admission of sci-
entific testimony at New York trials. For instance, the modified
Rule 702(b) could be titled "Reliable Scientific Testimony" and
provide:
Testimony concerning scientific matters, or testimony concerning the result
of a scientific procedure, test or experiment is admissible provided: (1) *here
ity-e the theory or principle underlying the matter, procedure, test or ex-
periment is scientifically valid; (2) ther-- g .. r.. a... ....... w ith the
*J...-...nt s".ent fie eantntiy that the procedure, test, or experiment is reli-
able and produces accurate results; and (3) the particular test, procedure or
experiment was conducted in such a way as to yield an accurate result.
Upon request of a party, a determination pursuant to this subdivision shall
be made before the commencement of trial.-6 5
These alterations in the form of proposed Rule 702(b) would be
necessary to evince the clear intent to move the state's evidence
law toward a "reliability" approach.
Such a re-written scientific testimony rule would redound to
the State's advantage. First, the re-draft would eliminate the
anachronistic and highly criticized Frye rule from New York's evi-
dence law. Second, the new proposal would firmly ensconce the
"reliability" test in the consolidated laws, thus ensuring that valid-
164. Legislatures have often made changes to evidence proposals before enacting them
into law. E.g., Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Report On Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) ("The second sentence of Rule 404(b) as submitted to Congress began with
the words 'This subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered.' The committee
amended this language to read 'It may, however, be admissible.' ") reprinted in ERIC D.
GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SELECTED LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY AND NEW CASES AND PROBLEMS (1992); Report of the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ("Clearly, the most far-reaching House change in the
rules as promulgated, was the elimination of the Court's proposed rules on privilege con-
tained in Article V.") reprinted in ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE WITH SELECTED LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND NEW CASES AND PROBLEMS (1992).
165. See THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 162 (1991) (language to be deleted has been lined-out; language to be
added appears in italics).
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ity, and not mere relevance,166 will be the operative admissibility
standard. Finally, the updated rule would bring New York's scien-
tific evidence standard into line, at least in result, with federal law
and the growing trend of evidence law in the other states.
CONCLUSION
An important scientific technique rarely makes its way by gradually winning
over and converting its opponents: it rarely happens that Saul becomes
Paul. What does happen is that its opponents gradually die out and that the
growing generation is familiarized with the idea from the beginning. 167
In 1936, Max Planck, famous for his developments in quantum
theory, expounded upon a simple fact concerning the relationship
between valid science and scientists, a fact that courts were unable
to translate into law for six decades. The Supreme Court decided
in 1994 that law should reflect reality.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals has sounded the
death knell for using Frye's anachronistic "general acceptance"
test as the basis for determining the admissibility of novel scien-
166. Possibly because of the concern that the language of the Federal Rule of Evidence
702 embodies or could be construed to demand a mere "relevance" standard for novel scien-
tific testimony, see supra note 62, the drafters of New York's proposed code have turned
away from adopting the text of the Federal Rule verbatim. For the textual language of Fed-
eral Rule 702, see supra note 42. In both the 1980 and 1982 New York evidence code pro-
posals, the Law Revision Commission had submitted a rule to govern the admissibility of
expert testimony that mirrored the text of Federal Rule 702 verbatim. THE NEW YORK
STATE LAW REVIEW COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 150-51
(1980); THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 163-65 (1982).
The current proposal embodied in New York Rule 702 diverges markedly from the Fed-
eral Rule. First, subsection 702(a) eschews the federal "helpfulness" approach and instead
requires that, to be admissible, expert testimony must not merely help the jury but must be
"beyond the understanding" or "dispel misconceptions of the typical trier of fact." THE
NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK
161-62 (1991). Second, as discussed throughout this comment, subsection 702(b) proposes
the enactment of the Frye methodology.
Because of political necessities, the drafters have chosen to abandon their earlier drafts
that were virtual mirror images of the Federal Rules in favor of the current proposal.
Salken, supra note 33, at 673. Codification of a mirror image of Federal Rule 702 would
achieve the greatest level of uniformity between New York's law and the law of both federal
and other states' courts. Despite this fact, New York's political realities and the structure of
the current evidence-code proposal make adoption of a rule mirroring Federal Rule 702 un-
likely at best.
167. MAX PLANCK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS 90 (1936). The abstruse reference to
Saul becoming Paul is apparently an allusion to the biblical story of Saul's revelation on the
road to Damascus. Saul, a sinner, changed his evil ways after a visit from the Lord, and was
shortly thereafter renamed Paul. Acts 9:13.
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tific testimony. Frye, long used by courts nationwide, has been ef-
fectively criticized by scholars and jurists alike. The Daubert
Court, by determining that the Federal Rules demand a "reliabil-
ity" standard, has ushered in a new era in expert testimony law.
New York would be mistaken to implant the Frye methodol-
ogy into the consolidated laws by enacting the current draft of pro-
posed Rule 702(b). Because Rule 702(b) embodies the "general ac-
ceptance" language, it is open to the same effective criticism that
has critically wounded Frye. Furthermore, adopting proposed Rule
702(b) would fly in the face of reasoning used by the Supreme
Court in the Daubert' decision, a logic that has begun to become
the common evidentiary tongue of the nation. Because enactment
of draft Rule 702(b) would abandon New York's opportunity to
garner the fruits of uniformity in and reform of its evidence law, it
should be rejected. Simple logic demands that reliability, not "gen-
eral acceptance," be the basis for admitting novel science in New
York courts. The legislature should amend Rule 702(b)
accordingly.

